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The large increase in the collection of location, communication, health data etc. from seized digital
devices like mobile phones, tablets, IoT devices, laptops etc. often poses serious privacy risks. To measure
privacy risks, privacy impact assessments (PIA) are substantially useful tools and the Directive EU 2016/
80 (Police Directive) requires their use. While much has been said about PIA methods pursuant to the
Regulation EU 2016/679 (GDPR), less has been said about PIA methods pursuant to the Police Directive.
Yet, little research has been done to explore and measure privacy risks that are specific to law
enforcement activities which necessitate the processing of large amounts of data. This study tries to fill
this gap by conducting a PIA on a big data forensic platform as a case study. This study also answers the
question how a PIA should be carried out for large-scale digital forensic operations and describes the
privacy risks, threats we learned from conducting it. Finally, it articulates concrete privacy measures to
demonstrate compliance with the Police Directive.
© 2020 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
The personal data processing of large-scale digital evidence in
criminal investigations falls within the scope of Directive (EU)
2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council (the so-
called Police Directive). This legislative instrument has entered
into force on the 5th May 2016 and repeals Council Framework
Decision 2008/977/JHA. This directive not only protects individuals’
personal data which are being processed for the purposes of the
prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal of-
fences or the execution of criminal penalties but also ensures a high
level of public security by the free flow of such data between
competent authorities. Member States were expected to transpose
the directive into national law fromMay 2016 toMay 2018 (EC& EP,
2016a).
One of the most important provisions of the directive is set out
in Article 4(1) (EUR-Lex, 2017) which states that personal data of
natural personsmust be: a) processed lawfully and fairly; b) collectedBox72, 9700 AB, Groningen,
Bas Seyyar), z.geradts@nfi.nl
r Ltd. This is an open access articlefor specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and processed only in
line with these purposes; c) adequate, relevant and not excessive in
relation to the purpose in which they are processed; d) accurate and
updated where necessary; e) kept in a formwhich allows identification
of the individual for no longer than is necessary for the purpose of the
processing; f) appropriately secured, including protection against
unauthorised or unlawful processing. The said Article 4 stipulates
that Member States shall ensure that the processing is in accor-
dance with the principles of necessity and proportionality (EC& EP,
2016a).
The Police Directive contains various novel provisions to address
the limited scope and the outdatedness of the Framework Decision
(de Hert and Papakonstantinou, 2016). At first glance, data pro-
tection by design and by default are introduced in Article 20 as two
of the obligations of the controller. Thus, the competent authorities
must take into account these two principles both at the time of the
determination of the means for processing and at the time of the
processing itself. Another novelty is the notification of a personal
data breach to the supervisory authority as stipulated in Article 30.
Moreover, designation of a data protection officer is introduced in
Article 32 as a new obligation for the controller. Last but not least,
the directive provides new rights to data subjects which include
right to receive information by the data subject (Article 13), right ofunder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
M. Bas Seyyar, Z.J.M.H. Geradts / Forensic Science International: Digital Investigation 33 (2020) 2009062access by the data subject (Article 14), and right to rectification or
erasure of personal data (Article 16) (Leiser and Custers, 2019).
Whereas there has been an intense debate about the role,
impact and practical implementation of the Police Directive, it is
clear that the directive is a positive improvement towards a
comprehensive data protection in EU (EDPS, 2015). Another inter-
esting debate is that the right to data protection and public security
seem to be as competing interests (Europol, 2018). This imple-
mentation comes against the background of a debate on how the
right to data protection and the right to security can be balanced
within a society where the police may at times seemingly give
priority to the obligation to keep society safe over privacy and data
protection. As underlined by the European Court of Human Rights’
case law (Volker und Markus Schecke GbR (C-92/09), Hartmut
Eifert (C-93/09) v Land Hessen, 2010), the right to the protection
of personal data is not an absolute right; that is, the enjoyment of
this right may be limited to ensure that other rights are protected,
such as when protecting society from crime and terrorism.
What is missing from the Police Directive is the guidelines on
how to successfully implement appropriate safeguards for
compliance (Marquenie, 2017). One of the provisions requires data
controller to carry out a Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA)
as addressed in Article 27. DPIAs (previously known as privacy
impact assessments (PIAs)) are tools to evaluate the origin, nature,
particularity and severity of risks to the rights and freedoms of
natural persons and to determine the appropriate measures (EC &
EP, 2016b).
Howmember states determinewhether a PIA (DPIA can to some
extent be seen as a GDPR checklist and primarily focused on ’data
protection’ while PIA includes both the right to private life and the
right to data protection. Because of its broad scope, we use the term
PIA instead of the term DPIA used in the Police Directive) has to be
carried out is provided in Article 27(1) as follows:Where a type of
processing, in particular, using new technologies, and taking into ac-
count the nature, scope, context and purposes of the processing is
likely to result in a high risk to the rights and freedoms of natural
persons, Member States shall provide for the controller to carry out,
prior to the processing, an assessment of the impact of the envisaged
processing operations on the protection of personal data. Further-
more, Article 27(2) provides a minimum standard for conducting a
PIA:The assessment referred to in paragraph 1 shall contain at least a
general description of the envisaged processing operations, an
assessment of the risks to the rights and freedoms of data subjects, the
measures envisaged to address those risks, safeguards, security mea-
sures and mechanisms to ensure the protection of personal data and to
demonstrate compliance with this Directive, taking into account the
rights and legitimate interests of the data subjects and other persons
concerned(EC & EP, 2016a).
Fortunately PIAs have been studied in detail since the mid-
1990s (Wadhwa and Rodrigues, 2013). There are plenty of PIA
methods which are proposed by researchers, governments, Data
Protection Authorities (DPAs) and standards bodies. Yet, more
industry/technology-oriented PIA methods are developed, such as
the RFID PIA (Spiekermann, 2012) and Smart Grid DPIA template
(Smart Grid Task Force, 2012e14 Expert Group 2, 2014). However, it
is not the case for the police sector. The costs of using a PIA
methodology not considering the unique nature of police activities
can be insufficient identification of risks and difficulty in demon-
strating compliance with the Police Directive.
This paper addresses these issues by evaluating existent PIA
methods, providing a comprehensive methodology for digital fo-
rensics based on hands-on experiencewith a particular attention to
large-scale processing. This work is an important step towards a
better understanding of privacy risks specific to law enforcement
processing practices by establishing a baseline for the assessmentand treatment of these risks. Lastly, it presents a guide to the
implementation of privacy-by-design (PbD) principles in large-
scale digital forensic investigations.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2
presents Hansken and discusses state of the art. Section 3 de-
scribes the methodology. Section 4 gives an overview of the results
of the case study. Finally, Section 5 presents our conclusions and
our plans for future work.
2. State of the art
Since we propose to conduct a case study on Hansken, we first
give an overview of Hansken in this section.
2.1. Introduction to digital forensics as a service (DFaaS)
In this section we present Hansken and its predecessor, so-
called Xiraf (an XML Information Retrieval Approach to digital
Forensics).
Xiraf was developed by the Netherlands Forensic Institute (NFI)
as an XML-based approach to manage and query forensic traces
from the high volume of seized digital material. Xiraf executes lots
of forensic analysis tools in a systematic way for extracting traces as
XML-based outputs. In this way, the outputs of analysis tools are
integrated in order to be indexed and queried in a centralized XML-
database. Users are able to search and browse the outputs through
aweb interface (Alink et al., 2006). Its next versionwas described as
a second generation forensic analysis system with new functions
such as parallel execution, reduced I/O, distributed processing and
more (Bhoedjang et al., 2012). Its latest version is a service based
approach named DFaaS. Unlike traditional digital investigation
process, the data, the software and the storage and processing ca-
pacity are centralized. So, this version provides faster forensic
analysis process, sooner trace availability, reduced overhead time
and central system that can used by multiple departments
concurrently (van Baar et al., 2014).
Hansken is the successor of Xiraf with a capacity of processing
three terabytes of data per hour. Three main reasons for developing
Hansken are to minimize case lead time, maximize trace coverage
and specialization of people involved. Considering the sensitivity of
the processed data in such a big data platform, the developers
specified eight design principles: (1) Security, (2) Privacy, (3)
Transparency, (4) Multi-tenancy, (5) Future proof, (6) Data reten-
tion, (7) Reliability, (8) High availability. As a big data solution,
Hadoop Distributed File System (HDFS) andMap Reducewere used.
Hansken is the first large-scale digital forensic system that is
implemented PbD in mind (van Beek et al., 2015).
2.2. PIAs in law enforcement and justice sectors
An attempt to draft a comprehensive PIA methodology for law
enforcement agencies (LEAs) was made in an European Commis-
sion's project which is Visual Analytics for Sense-making in Crim-
inal Intelligence Analysis (VALCRI). In their white paper, Schlehahn
et al. (2014) present a comparative analysis of DPIA methodologies
of five European countries which are Belgium, France, Germany,
Spain and United Kingdom and the Article 29 Working Party
Guidelines. Their results show that none of the compared meth-
odologies refer to the application area of Police Directive. Also, they
claim that the risk for an interference on fundamental rights always
exists on law enforcement processing even if it is legally justified.
No matter of which methodology chosen, PIAs should be used to
minimize this interference as much as necessary and appropriate
safeguards should be built into processes and systems.
In 2014, the Information Commissioner of the Republic of
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new police powers. According to the Commissioner, a PIA should be
conducted for new legislative proposals dealing with police powers
before entering standard legislative process, especially if these
proposals have strong technological aspect(s). The guidelines lay
out how to identify and manage privacy risks for adopting possibly
privacy invasive technologies with a particular attention to the
required analysis of the necessity, suitability, effectiveness, and
proportionality of the proposal. A case study for a draft legislation is
included to show how to conduct a PIA based on these guidelines.
Similarly, the Dutch government developed its own PIA model for
draft legislations for not only police powers but also other legal
areas. This PIA model is included in the Integrated Policy and
Regulatory Assessment Framework (IAK) (Dutch: Integraal Afwe-
gingskader beleid en regelgeving). Thus, it is mandatory for the
government to take the results of a PIA into account when devel-
oping new legislation (Ministerie van BZK & Ministerie van VenJ,
2017). These initiatives are not at a level of technological devel-
opment itself but at a ’higher’ level, at the legislation level. While
one might argue that a PIA at legislation level means that the legal
basis of the technological development is privacy friendly/sound, in
reality, this level may not be enough and a PIA at technology level
may identify different or more risks that are not immediately
evident at legislation level.
3. Methodology
This paper describes how to conduct a PIA in large-scale digital
forensic investigations. To this end, we conduct a case study where
the big data forensic platform (the so-called DFaaS) developed by
the NFI is used as an example to carry out the PIA. This big data
forensic solution is called Hansken as mentioned in Section 2.1. To
process and investigate multiple terabytes of seized digital mate-
rial, the NFI has been using DFaaS since December 2010 (van Beek
et al., 2015). The reasons for the selection of Hansken are as follows:
it processes large volume of forensic data, it has built-in privacy
measures for the processed data and its users (forensic in-
vestigators), transparency is one of the design principles and
ranked third in terms of priority (van Beek et al., 2015).
This paper searches for examples of best practice to construct an
optimal PIA methodology that best suits Police Directive re-
quirements. For this purpose, we systematically analysed current
PIA methods. The review ended in ten fundamental PIA methods:
Canada Directive on PIA (Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat,
2010), CNIL (French National Commission on Informatics and Lib-
erty) PIA Methodology (CNIL, 2017), DPIA Process under EU GDPR
(Bieker et al., 2016), Dutch National Government PIA Model (Dutch
PIA Model) (Dutch: Model gegevensbeschermingseffectbeoordel-
ing rijksdienst) (Ministerie van BZK & Ministerie van VenJ, 2017),
ISO 29134 (ISO, 2017), NZ OPC (New Zealand's Office of the Privacy
Commissioner) PIA Toolkit (NZ OPC, 2015), OAIC (Office of the
Australian Information Commissioner) PIA Guide (OAIC, 2014), PIA
Framework (PIAF) (Wright, 2013), Systematic Methodology for PIAs
(Oetzel and Spiekermann, 2014), UK ICO (United Kingdom's Infor-
mation Commissioner's Office) COP (Conducting PIAs Code of
Practice) (UK ICO, 2014). These methodologies have some similar-
ities like containing a threshold analysis to test the necessity of PIA
and threat examples; also some differences like risk identification
and evaluation approaches (Vemou and Karyda, 2018).
Each method has its strengths and limitations. After a compar-
ative analysis, we combined the best elements (strong points) of
three methodologies; which are CNIL PIAmethod, Dutch PIA Model
and ISO 29134. At a glance, we selected the PIA guidelines that have
been recently proposed or updated especially after the GDPR. Since
the Police Directive and the GDPR propose similar solutions inmany areas (de Hert and Sajfert, 2018), we included the methods
being in line with the GDPR. Vemou and Karyda (Vemou and
Karyda, 2018) argued that relying on specific legal frameworks
may limit PIAs to a compliance check instead of a comprehensive
review of privacy issues of a process. Hence, the inclusion of an
international standard on PIA; that is ISO/IEC 29134, contributes to
mitigate such limitations.
In details, our evaluation is based on the following benchmarks
of ten PIA methods:
1 Is the PIA method up-to-date?
2 Is the GDPR used as a legal basis?
3 Does the PIA method provide an automatizing tool?
4 Is a guidance on how to conduct a PIA in big data context given?
Does the PIA method contain a checklist/a set of questions
addressing privacy risks/threats of large-scale data processing?
Almost every DPA (or ICO) provides guidelines on the implica-
tions of big data for data protection. However, guidance for big
data-specific PIA is offered only in UK PIA COP (UK ICO, 2017) and
Dutch PIA Model (JenV, 2018) as shown in Table 1. Both of the
supplements are based on the existing PIA methodologies, key
points and experience gained with Big Data. What is more, Dutch
PIA Model is predicated on not only the GDPR but also the Police
Directive. It proposes similar procedures for the similar articles (or
recitals) with further assistance for the exceptional circumstances
in the Police Directive. Similarly, the main criterion for choosing
CNIL PIAMethod is that it is supported by an automated tool. Such a
tool may facilitate comparison, improve standardisation, support
enterprise accountability and ease the PIA process to implement
compliance, especially in multi-jurisdictional legal environments
(Tancock, 2015). Nevertheless, it is argued that none of the known
PIA tools are capable of addressing emerging changes in privacy
laws and bridging the knowledge gap between lawyers and engi-
neers both of whose contributions are essential for a successful PIA
(US Patent App. No. 15/459,909, 2017).
CNIL PIA consists of methodology, template and knowledge
bases. Its automated tool visually assists PIA practitioners and
provides practicality. Specifically, CNIL's tool is designed to aid the
organizations in building compliance (CNIL, 2017), to facilitate
commenting on and validating PIA-related issues and to increase
stakeholder involvement. It is noteworthy that the tool itself does
not automate the PIA process, instead it guides PIA steps, creates
PIA report, risk overview and risk mapping automatically. Also, it is
important not to focus solely on the threats stated in the guideline.
ISO 29134 adapted a checklist approach. Referring to other ISO
standards (e.g., ISO/IEC 29151, ISO/IEC 27002) in several articles
might cause PIA practitioners to loose time as it might be hard to
follow. Dutch PIA Model has seventeen points explained in details
for performing a PIA and a big data-specific supplement. It is a
problem that there is no English translation at the moment since it
is produced for proposed regulations and data processing by the
government.
4. Results and discussion
This study seeks to understand de facto privacy risks in a
centralized forensic platform processing large amounts of personal
data. So, the privacy risks which are solely specific to Hansken and
the processing of the NFI are irrelevant and beyond the scope of this
paper. Instead we generalize our findings to other similar plat-
forms. Likewise, we do not evaluate the privacy risks since they are
dependent on the priorities and risk criteria of LEAs.
It should be noted that the processing of the NFI falls in reality
under the GDPR. This is because theMinistry of Justice and Security
Table 1
Comparative analysis between PIA methods.
PIA
Methods










2010 Canada's Privacy Act 1985 ✕ ✕
CNIL PIA Methodology 2018 GDPR ✓ ✕
DPIA Process under EU GDPR 2016 GDPR ✕ ✕
Dutch
PIA Model
2017 GDPR & Police
Directive
✕ ✓
ISO 29134 2017 ✕ ✕ ✕
New Zealand PIA Toolkit 2015 New Zealand's Privacy Act 1993 ✕ ✕
OAIC PIA Guide 2014 Australia's Privacy Act 1988 ✕ ✕
PIAF 2013 ✕ ✕ ✕
Systematic Methodology for PIAs 2014 ✕ ✕ ✕
UK PIA COP 2014 UK's Data Protection Act 1998 ✕ ✓
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detection and prosecution of indictable offences or the enforce-
ment of punishments and no link can bemadewith the “competent
authority” as stated in the Directive. However, the forensic in-
vestigations in the majority of the member states (e.g., France,
Belgium, Spain) are performed by a police unit and the aforemen-
tioned processings fall under the Police Directive. Therefore, we
limit our case study to the Police Directive.4.1. General description of the envisaged processing operations
Hansken processes special categories of personal data and per-
sonal data relating to criminal convictions and offences on a large
scale. This processing is likely to result in high risk to the rights and
freedoms of natural persons. Also, an amendment of the Police Data
Act (Dutch: Wet politiegegevens (Wpg)) and the Judicial and
Criminal Records Act (Dutch: Wet justiti€ele gegevens (Wjsg)) to
implement the Police Directive has entered into force on January 1,
2019 after DFaaS has become a standard for criminal cases
(December 2010) (Decree implementing the Directive data
protection investigation and prosecution, 2019). The processing
within Hansken is expected to be in conformity with these new
provisions. For these reasons, a PIA should be carried out.
The NFI developed Hansken as a digital search engine for pro-
cessing and investigating high volumes of (seized) digital material.
Its goal is to give the right people access to the right information at
the right time. With Hansken, an investigator can quickly and
efficiently search for traces in large quantities of seized data carriers
such as computers and mobile phones. Anything that may be
relevant can be searched for, for example words and names or
properties of traces such as chat-messages, emails or photos,
whether or not takenwith a certain camera. Its processing provides
a significant contribution towards finding the truth in criminal
cases.
Hansken is used for case investigations on request and under
the direction of the police and the Public Prosecution Service (PPS)
(Dutch: Openbaar Ministerie (OM)). For this task, the NFI, the police
and the PPS are considered as joint controllers. The data for this
task are supplied by the police and/or other investigative author-
ities. Other usages are development of libraries and software and
giving courses on how to use Hansken. For these tasks, the NFI is
considered as the controller. These core tasks fall under Regulation
of the Minister of Security and Justice, dated 8 May 2012, no.
227774, containing provisions regarding the assignment of the NFI
(Regulation of NFI duties) (Regeling taken NFI, 2012).
Possible data subjects are convict(s), suspect(s), victim(s), wit-
ness(es) and third parties who have nothing to do with the inves-
tigation, or persons who are wrongly suspected. With Hansken, allcategories of personal data can be processed. For example, infor-
mation from a mobile telephone contains among other things
photograph, names, phone numbers, e-mails, meta-data, location
data, payment data, video, data concerning religious conceptions or
health etc. Thus, the processing can therefore concern common
personal data and sensitive personal data (Recital 37 of the Police
Directive (EC & EP, 2016a)). The persons who access the case data
are officials from Hansken team.
Within Hansken framework, there is a wide variety of sup-
porting assets, ranging from forensic analysis tools to big data so-
lutions. The forensic tools collection consists of existing forensic
tools, both publicly available tools such as UFED, EnCase, FTK, EXIF
etc. and tools that is developed in-house. HDFS, Map Reduce, Cas-
sandra, HBase, Elastic Search, Kafka are some of the modules/
components used in DFaaS architecture. Discussing all these assets
in detail goes beyond the scope of this paper.
Strategies for privacy and security are based on the command-
ments from the Jericho Forum. The Jericho Forum consisting of IT
customers and vendor organisations proposes a new security
model called de-perimeterisation instead of central protection
(Lacey, 2005). The goal of de-perimeterisation is to make infor-
mation flows boundaryless by using encryption, inherently secure
computer protocols, inherently secure computer systems and data
level authentication (van Beek et al., 2015). Apart from that, role-
based access control (RBAC) is used for identity and user manage-
ment. With RBAC, access rights are linked to roles within the or-
ganization or business process. System users obtain access rights by
fulfilling a certain role.
Once the data are read from the seized material, it becomes
encrypted. Stored data are encrypted too. The encryption keys are
stored in a different domain and separated from the encrypted
image. All requests to the central service like authentication,
authorization, data uploads, forensic queries, content retrievals are
logged. Any privacy-sensitive information in log messages is
removed by replacing identifying (tagged) information with ano-
nymized (irreversible) or deidentified (reversible) values. To
reverse deidentified values, access to the cryptographic keys is
required. Hansken uses HDFS which ensures data availability with
three replicas per file by default. Additionally, Hansken works on a
copy of the seizedmaterial, so the original data are still available for
recovery.
Indexing and analysing high volume of seized digital material
are main interests for Hansken's usage. These usages are necessary,
otherwise searching for traces would be time consuming and
detection capacity would be scarce. Based on the data processed by
Hansken, no automated decisions producing legal effects for the
people concerned or significantly affects him or her, are taken. Final
decisions regarding data subjects are always taken with human
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Statutory protected categories of data (e.g., correspondence
between lawyers and/or doctors and their clients, hereafter
referred to as ’confidentiality communication’) should be protected
from being disclosed in criminal proceedings as stated in Code of
Criminal Procedure (Dutch: Wetboek van Strafvordering (WvSv),
Article 126aa(2)). Within Hansken there is a tool to exclude confi-
dentiality communication. That tool works as follows: The defence
lawyer provides a list of keywords, files, folders etc. that are highly
likely to contain confidentiality communication. The traces having
one or more hits according to the list are given the status ’marked’
(suspected). Furthermore, when someone investigating data in
Hansken encounters suspected confidentiality communication, he/
she gives the trace the status ’marked’ too. An assessor, an
employee who is not involved in the investigation and has specific
authorizations, then decides whether confidentiality communica-
tion is indeed involved. If that is the case, the trace is given the
status ’confirmed’. If there is no confidentiality communication, the
trace will receive the status “rejected”. For Hansken users such as
the investigators, only the traces with the status ’unmarked’ and
’rejected’ can be requested (ECLI: Netherlands: RBAMS:
2018:2504). The functionality of this tool is in compliance with the
instruction manual adopted by National Assembly Investigation
Officers (National Assembly Investigation Officers (Dutch.
Landelijke Vergadering Rechercheofficieren), 2014).
Hansken may be used for profiling the suspects. For instance,
location and behavioural characteristics of a suspect can be deter-
mined on the basis of the digital evidences. Algorithms and tech-
niques used in Hansken have been scientifically tested, as shown in
publications or peer reviews. Some of them are publicly available
like firearm detection and geodata extraction algorithms. The
others are not released publicly because this can potentially harm
the detection process. However, insight might be given to the
defence as to how the data have been processed in a certain case, as
allowed by the examining magistrate. Hansken uses big data: by
using large amounts of structured and unstructured data from
different sources, data are analysed to look for traces and correla-
tions that can provide knowledge for investigations.
Regulation of NFI duties, Criminal Experts Act (Dutch: Besluit
register deskundige in strafzaken (DIS)), Code of Criminal Proced-
ure (WvSv), conventions such as the Prüm Treaty and International
Legal Assistance Convention (Dutch: Internationale Rechtshulp-
verdragen) provide the necessary legal grounds for the processing
within Hansken. In addition, in the Ennetcom-case (ECLI:
Netherlands: RBAMS: 2018:2504), the court ruled that the results
obtained fromHansken are not unreliable, that the procedures have
been sufficiently controllable by the defence and that the use of
such helps does not require any additional legal provisions. The
obligation for the NFI to process personal data may, if appropriate,
arise from Criminal Experts Act. On the basis of this law, experts of
the NFI can receive instructions for carrying out an expert investi-
gation from the examining magistrate or the public prosecutor. The
personal data are not processed for another purpose then for which
it has been collected, namely for the detection of criminal offences.
Personal data from a specific case are not combined with personal
data from another case, unless the PPS has given specific permis-
sion to the NFI.
Having access to and being able to analyse large amount of data
are crucial in the process of truth-finding. For analysing such large
volume of forensic data within a reasonable time, there is no less
intrusive way than using Hansken. Therefore, it can be judged that
the means are proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.
Furthermore, the processing purposes cannot be achieved if fewer
data were processed in Hansken. For finding the truth in (criminal)
cases it is of great importance that not too little data are collected,because precisely as complete a picture as possible has to be
created of a situation/suspect, also to relieve the suspect. A relevant
research question can be for example: Does X appear in the file?
Such a question can only be answered by searching through all
available material. All data processed in Hansken are necessary for
achieving the goal, precisely because links are sought in a process
that can serve as evidence. It is not always possible to determine in
advance which/what type of data and which person is involved. In
that sense, “data minimization” cannot be met.
The NFI has been accredited by the Dutch Accreditation Council
in a number of fields based on EN ISO 15189:2012, EN ISO/IEC
17025:2005, EN ISO/IEC 17020:2012 (Dutch Accreditation Council,
2019) and complies with The National Government Information
Security Baseline 2017 (Dutch: Baseline Informatiebeveiliging
Rijksdienst (BIR)) according to the “comply or explain” principle.
4.2. Assessment of the risks to the rights and freedoms of data
subjects
The privacy risks specified in this section are in line with CNIL
PIA Methodology and ISO 29134 (CNIL, 2017; ISO, 2017).
4.2.1. Illegitimate access to data
Illegitimate access may lead to considerable damages to the data
subjects due to the amount and privacy sensitivity of the data such
as discrimination, damage to reputation, financial loss etc. Further,
any unauthorised disclosure may have a negative influence on the
discovery of truth in criminal investigations. For instance, a situa-
tion where a suspect finds out by means of an unauthorized access
that he/she is under secret investigation may frustrate the
investigation.
Some main threats that can lead to an illegitimate access are as
follows: (1) Data process/read for wrong case. (2) Unencrypted data
transmission from third parties. (3) Unauthorized person access to
the big data forensic platform. (4) Investigation report (paper
documents) sent to wrong destination. (5) Access to data after case
is closed. (6) No systematic monitoring of authorizations. (7) Ille-
gitimate cross-referencing of data (ISO, 2017).
4.2.2. Unwanted change of data
Unwanted change of data may cause the big data forensic
platform to fail to operate correctly. Also, the processing could be
misused for evidence manipulation; a piece of evidence might be
altered in other valid data such as data about location or move-
ments, economic situation, etc. As a result, theremight be occasions
where someone commits a crime and an innocent person is
accused of it and personal data are processed in a manner that is
incompatible with specified and legitimate purposes.
Some main threats that can lead to unwanted change of data
access are as follows: (1) Errors during updates, configuration or
maintenance (ISO, 2017). (2) Malicious code injection (CNIL, 2017).
(3) Replacement of an original document (paper) by a forgery (ISO,
2017). (4) Replacement of components (ISO, 2017). (5) Authoriza-
tions not granted at case level. (6) Not to ensure separation of duties
(e.g., between system administrators, operators and investigators).
(7) Errors while uploading seized digital material. (8) Insufficient
knowledge of the software.
4.2.3. Disappearance of data
Disappearance of data may dramatically effect data availability.
In digital investigations, data availability should be high, preferably
24/7, otherwise the amount of evidence found in digital material
will decrease and time needed to solve a case will increase (van
Beek et al., 2015). Like unwanted change of data, data disappear-
ance may cause to malfunction. In consequence, the outcomes of
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the data subject.
Some main threats that can lead to disappearance of data are as
follows: (1) Processing capacity overload (ISO, 2017). (2) Denial of
service attack (CNIL, 2017). (3) Ageing of archived documents (CNIL,
2017). (4) Loss of encryption key. (5) Assignment of poorly trained
employees. (6) Under tested software/hardware integration.4.3. The measures envisaged to address the risks
In this section, we discuss appropriate measures for a big data
forensic platform, as summarised in Table 2, to address the privacy
risks identified in the previous section.
1 Access to the platform should be permitted only to personnel
who possess a security clearance.
2 If an investigator is no longer working on a case, his/her
access to the case data should be immediately withdrawn.
3 LEAs should impose strict data retention periods in accor-
dance with the requirements of all applicable legislation. In
case of a need for longer retention periods, the data should
be anonymized. Also, specifications on how to destroy the
personal data in a secure manner should be developed.
Procedural measures have to be in place to ensure retention
and destroy policies are respected.Table 2
Summary of threats, privacy risks, measures to address the risks and related provisions
Examples of Threats Privacy
1
Data process/read for wrong case.
2
Unencrypted data transmission from third parties.
3
Unauthorized person access to the big data forensic platform.
4
Investigation report (paper documents) sent to wrong destination.
5
Access to data after case is closed.
6
No systematic monitoring of authorizations.
7
Illegitimate cross-referencing of data
Illegiti
1 Errors during updates, configuration or maintenance
2 Malicious code injection
3 Replacement of an original document (paper) by a forgery
4 Replacement of components
5 Authorizations not granted at case level
6 Not to ensure separation of duties
7 Errors while uploading seized digital material
8 Insufficient knowledge of the software
Unwan
1 Processing capacity overload
2 Denial of service attack
3 Ageing of archived documents
4 Loss of encryption key
5 Assignment of poorly trained employees.
6 Under tested software/hardware integration
Disap4 Case data and queries made by investigators for searching
traces should be kept encrypted.
5 Software used in the platform especially forensic analysis
tools should be analysed with regard to privacy.
6 Confidentiality communication (e.g., information covered by
legal professional privilege) should be excluded as evidence
for criminal prosecution. Unfortunately, there does not exist
a forensically sound procedure that is able to guarantee the
protection of confidentiality communication and current
practices require manual intervention (Jiang et al., 2013).
Hence, the disclosure of such information should, as far as
possible, be protected. To this end, a list of keywords to filter
out the relating privileged data might be specified in
advance. The defence lawyer might be consulted for speci-
fying the possible keywords. Search for these keywords
should only be allowed with prior justification (Naudts,
2018). It is possible that the traces are not correctly recog-
nized as privileged and not filtered out during the investi-
gation. In this case, an investigator might mark traces as
privileged and filter them out immediately. Likewise, it is
also possible that some data are incorrectly classified as
privileged. In this case, an officer being not involved in the
investigation may be designated and he/she may restore
non-privileged data.
7 To reduce the risk impact, it should be ensured that any
disclosure of personal data is detected as soon as possiblein the Police Directive (* Recital, ** Article).
Risks Measures Provisions
mate access to data 1 Best Practice
2 Rec.* 37








10 Rec. 57, 96; Art.25
11 Art.29(e)
14 Rec 31; Art.6
16 Best Practice






10 Rec. 57, 96; Art.25
11 Art.29(e)
12 Rec. 33,96; Art. 29(j)
13 Rec.30, Art.7(2)(3),16(3a)
16 Best Practice




10 Rec. 57, 96; Art.25
11 Art.29(e)
12 Rec. 33,96; Art. 29(j)
16 Best Practice
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accordingly.
8 Datasets used for training and software testing should be
anonymized.
9 Strict access control policies should be in place to limit the
risk of unauthorised access to personal data.
10 Any user/system actions should be logged, attributed to di-
agnose any privacy breaches and to preserve the chain of
evidence. Article 25 of the Police Directive sets out how
detailed the logs should be as follows: the justification, date
and time of such operations and, as far as possible, the identi-
fication of the person who consulted or disclosed personal data,
and the identity of the recipients of such personal data. The said
article also limits the usage of logs. To protect the privacy of
employees, logs might be pseudonymised too.
11 To implement the principle of purpose limitation, the big
data forensic platform should keep an explicit audit trail of
user actions. Audit trails may verify that the actions of the
forensic investigator are within the scope of a warrant/court
order and also reinforce the evidence reliability (Adams,
2008). To achieve a higher-level of auditing, unique user
profiles which are tied to individual analysts and allow for
varying degrees of access to data based on the tasks assigned
and clearance given may be provided (Marquenie and
Coudert, 2017).
12 It is important that the case data (seized digital material) are
handled meticulously and carefully throughout the entire
investigation: both when collecting data from third parties
and when transferring it to the platform. The original digital
material should be kept outside of the platform's processing,
an exact copy should be made and used for searching traces.
To monitor its integrity and minimize the errors, a hash
function and a message authentication code (MAC) could be
used.
13 To ensure data accuracy, the data must be categorized ac-
cording to its reliability. For this purpose, 4x4x4 (Belgium) or
5x5x5 (UK) grid structures could be used as an example. For
instance, in UK ’s structure (College of Policing, 2019), the
data are described in 5 categories as follows: (A) Known
directly to the source, (B) Known indirectly to the source but
corroborated, (C) Known indirectly to the source, (D) Not
known, (E) Suspected to be false (Marquenie and Coudert,
2017). By the same token, it is desirable to clearly distin-
guish primary data sources (the sources where data are
actually generated) from secondary ones (sources that link
existing data sets and (re)use them) (JenV, 2018).
14 A distinction between different categories of data subjects
should be drawn. The personal data of convicts, suspects,
victims, witnesses and third parties should be treated
differently as addressed in Article 6 of the Police Directive.
For instance, different degree of anonymization (e.g., irre-
versible or de-identified (reversible)) may be used for
different categories of data subjects.
15 The potential discriminatory factors (e.g., the training data,
the learning algorithm etc.) should be tested whether they
create biases for natural persons (especially for profiling). If
so, they shall be prohibited.
16 Algorithms and techniques which are scientifically derived
and proven should be used in the platform. The margin of
error associated with them should be determined by taking
into account their potential impact on the natural persons
(JenV, 2018).
17 Competent authorities could be encouraged in publishing
their PIA reports (executive summary) on a publicly available
platform.4.3.1. Discussion of principles relating to processing of personal
data in law enforcement sector
The processing of personal data in a big data forensic platform is
not transparent. The data subjects such as suspects do not always
know if and how their personal data are being processed. So, they
cannot be asked to give their consent to the processing. They also
lack insight into the accuracy and completeness of their personal
data. The personal data of the persons who have nothing to do with
the criminal investigation might also be processed in such a plat-
form. These persons are not able to make use of their rights under
Police Directive. It is actually impracticable for the competent au-
thorities to be transparent about data processing of natural per-
sons, as this involves a disproportionate amount of time and effort
and the process of truth-finding may be frustrated. Since it is
difficult to determine in advance which information is relevant to
the case and which is not, data minimization might not be imple-
mented in the criminal investigations.
Because the persons involved are often unable to exercise some
of their rights, it is of great importance that the processing in a big
data forensic platform is subject to an external control/audit by the
supervisory authority. Additionally, the competent authorities
might provide a clear explanation concerning the use of personal
data in relation to forensic investigation within the big data plat-
form in their website and/or social media account. In this context,
an explanation of how to challenge the decisions made with the
help of the platformmay be put on the website for future reference.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we described how to conduct a PIA on a big data
forensic platform. To this end, we compared several PIA methods
and selected three that best suit our requirements, since there do
not exist a PIA methodology that is in conformity with the Police
Directive with a focus on law enforcement activities.
Our study demonstrates firstly the importance of conducting a
PIA for all forensic platforms. Seized digital material may contain
large amounts of common and sensitive personal data of everyone
involved in a crime. Hence, the processing for forensic purposes is
more likely to result in an interference in the fundamental rights of
data subjects. PIAs may be of benefit to minimize this interference.
Secondly, the findings from this study strengthen the position that
privacy correlates with security. Necessary measures should also be
taken to ensure the security of such forensic platforms.
This case study reveals that threats in police sector that can lead
to privacy risks are rather different from those in other sectors.
Collaboration between the investigators and PIA practitioners is
crucial in precisely specifying these threats. The implementation of
a PIA encourages privacy awareness within the investigators and
the developers of a big data forensic platform. It is worth noting
that PIAs should be carried out before the development of such
platforms.Whenever a shift in privacy objectives takes place during
the design phase, LEAs should repeat the PIA to address new pri-
vacy risks.
In future work, we plan to further investigate how to improve
the implementation of PbD in large-scale digital forensic in-
vestigations without reducing the effectiveness and the speed of
investigations.
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